Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples

Dussault, René and George Erasmus. “The High Arctic Relocation: A Report on the 1953–55
Relocation.”

Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples

Toronto: Canadian Government
Publishing, 1994
Summary of the Commission’s conclusion p.135-146

Inuit Dependence and Vulnerability

1. The High Arctic relocation took place in a cultural context where Inuit typically felt dependent upon non-Inuit and powerless in their dealing with them. The power that non-Inuit held over Inuit was well understood by non-Inuit, and even the wishes of well-intentioned non-Inuit could be taken as orders by Inuit. The government was present in the Arctic in the form of RCMP. Who were held in particular awe by the Inuit.

2. Not all Inuit were equally dependent or vulnerable in their relations with non-Inuit. There were indications that the dependence and vulnerability of the northern Quebec Inuit tended to be much greater than the people of northern Baffin Island.

Inuit Relationship to Homeland and Kin

3. The Inuit have a particular attachment to homeland and kin. This attachment was known by non-Inuit at the time of the relocation.

4. The Inukjuak area has been inhabited by large numbers of Inuit for centuries and is a traditional hunting and fishing area.

Paternalistic Government Decision Making

5. Government decision making concerning the Inuit into early 1950s typically did not take into account the wishes and aspirations of the Inuit. Instead, government decisions reflected a paternalistic view of what would be good for the Inuit and tended to minimize or disregard Inuit needs and desires.

Sovereignty as a Factor in the Relocation

6. The relocation took place at a time when the government was concerned about the facto Canadian sovereignty arising from the presence of the United States in the Arctic. The concern about the facto sovereignty involved a concern that Canada would not be seen to be controlling activities in the North so that, over time, Canada’s de jure sovereignty could be questioned. The weight of the evidence points to sovereignty as a material consideration in the relocation decision, although the primary concerns were social and economic.

Population Growth or Game decline Not Factors in the Relocation

7. The information available to the government in early 1950’s does not indicate that the Inukjuak area was experiencing population growth. Rather, high mortality rates tended to result in a stable population. Nor were there indications of serious decline in food game resources. In fact, the situation had not changed in 30 to 40 years.

The Preoccupation with ‘Handouts’

8. The re was a concern in the Department about the long-term instability of the fur trade and the capacity of the fur trade to sustain the income levels to which Inukjuak Inuit become accustomed. The government saw little prospect for increases earned income in the Inukjuak area, with the result that periodic reliance on relief would become a permanent feature of life and that other ‘handouts’, such as family allowance and old age pensions, arose periodically as a result of the cyclical nature of the fur trade, with poor years following good years over a four years cycle. It was considered that the Inukjuak Inuit were becoming dependant on ‘handouts’, with a consequent loss of self-reliance and moral decline.

The Objective of Increased Reliance on Hunting

9. Officials considered that greater reliance on hunting on the trade store would restore Inuit self-reliance and arrest the perceived moral decline. At the same time, this would resolve the perceived long-term economic concern regarding the instability of the fur trade, since a return to greater reliance on hunting would substitute for the income that fur trading would, in the long term, be unable to provide. This objective was never communicated to the Inuit.

“Overpopulation in Relation to Available Resources”

10. It was perceived that decreased reliance on the trade store through increased reliance on hunting would not be possible in the Inukjuak area unless Inuit were relocated to other parts of the Quebec coast, to the islands of Hudson Bay off the Quebec coast, or to other parts of the Arctic. In this sense, and in this sense only, The Inukjuak area was considered to be “over-populated in relations to available resources”. This phrase was unfortunately ambiguous and was thought by some to refer a hunting population outstripping available game food resources. In fact, it characterizes an economic concern of the government related to a desire to require Inuit to hunt more and rely less on earned income.

The Goal of ‘Rehabilitation’

11. The goal of restoring Inuit self-reliance and independence through greater reliance on hunting involved restoring the Inuit to what was perceived by non-Inuit to be their proper state. The goal was ‘rehabilitation’, and the High Arctic relocation would be understood at the time-though not by the Inuit-as a rehabilitation project.

Failure to Disclose the Rehabilitation Goal to the Inuit

12. The Inukjuak Inuit were not told that the government considered them to be in need of rehabilitation and that the goal of relocation would be rehabilitation.

Relocation Would Not Relieve the Cycles in Hunting and Trapping

13. At time of the 1953 relocation, the fur cycle was reaching its peak, and no able-bodied Inuit were on relief at Inukjuak. Hunting was good and conditions were much improved over those of 1949-50, when the fur economy collapse and a hard winter made hunting difficult. Such cycles occurred everywhere in the Arctic where Inuit lived by hunting and trapping. White fox trapping everywhere followed a four-year cycle. (Cycles would not necessarily coincide in the same years in different parts of the Arctic; however, the typical cycle was of four years’ duration.) Hunting, even in areas of relative abundance, could be affected by adverse weather or ice conditions or various migratory patterns. Relocating Inuit to other places would not relieve such variability in the conditions of life.

The Institutional Consensus Supporting Relocations

14. There was consensus among all those with an interest in Arctic affairs, including the various government departments concerned, the RCMP, the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches and the Hudson’s Bay Company, that relocation would solve perceived economic and social problems. There were, however, differences of opinion about how relocation should be undertaken, with some, such a Superintendent Larsen of the RCMP, advocating the creation of small communities with wooden houses and schools, so that the adult Inuit could maintain a hunting and trapping lifestyle while children received the education that would be essential in the future.

The Relocation Plan

15. The High Arctic relocation was conceived by the Department as a way to place Inuit in areas believed to have adequate game resources and to require them to live largely by hunting, with some opportunity to trap. A small trade store would be establish but would carry limited and basic stock. The RCMP would be responsible for administering the store and, with the limited and basic stock, would be required to ration items from the store to ensure equitable distribution. It would also be the role of the RCMP to “encourage” the Inuit to hunt.

The Coercive Aspect of the Plan

16. The relocation plan was inherently coercive. It was a plan designed to take people who were accustomed to an income economy, with the goods that income could purchase, and place them in a situation where they would be made to rely more heavily on game food, with all the hardship such a life naturally involve. The government did not need to use overt force. The imperative of survival the desired objective.

The Coercive Aspects of Life in the New Communities

17. Day-to-day life in the new communities would also have coercive elements. The RCMP were directed by Department not to give credit to trappers, even though giving credit, or grubstaking, was the common practice of trading companies. The RCMP were also directed to exercise a firm hand in the giving of relief. Insufficient supplies in the trade stores established in the new communities would mean the benefit of old age pensions and family allowance often would not reach the intended beneficiaries through goods issues from the store. Instead, these amount would be recorded as a book entry in a form of forced savings. RCMP ‘encouragement’ of the Inuit in furtherance on the projects objectives would result in the police telling the Inuit what to do and scolding them when they did not do what the police wanted. The Inuit camps were established at a distance from non-Inuit facilities to restrict contact between Inuit and non-Inuit and to prevent the Inuit from becoming a burden on the non-Inuit post base. All there small elements of coercion became additionally coercive when carried out by a police force.

Misplaced Notions of Success

18. The overt signs of success of such a project, namely, self-reliance, would be similar regardless of the state of mind of any of the relocatees. Whether of not the people were unhappy or had desire to return home, they would still have to hunt. Reports by officials stating consistently that the relocatees were doing well reflect the overt state of affairs but do not address the unhappiness that many relocates experienced and their desire to return home.

‘Rehabilitation’ versus Opportunities for Independent Hunters

19. Not all Inuit relied on income from trapping to the same extent. The relocation scheme might have been entirely satisfactory for people who lived largely from hunting, with income from trapping providing only a supplement, and who did not look to government support in poor fur years. There were Inuit who went to Resolute Bay from Pond Inlet who did find the relocation satisfactory. However, these Pond Inlet Inuit were not typical of all the relocatees, and the relocation scheme, by its own term, sought to relocate people who depended more heavily on an income economy, with government support as the safety net in poor years. Even the Pond Inlet Inuit at Grise Fiord, who where used to the support of a store, found conditions too hard. The recruitment of Inuit for the project was not, therefore, limited to those who had continued to live relatively distant from trading post, with income from trading providing only a supplement to what obtained from hunting.

Relocation A Regressive Step

20. At the time of relocation, Inukjuak was a substantial settlement with Hudson’s Bay Company post, a police post, church missions, a school, a nursing station, a Department of Transport weather station and radio facility, and port facility. The school and nursing station had been established relatively recently as part of a government program to remedy past decades of neglect. The relocation created new communities that would have no schools, no nursing station and no missions. In this respect, the decision would turn the clock back to the era when there were no such facilities.

Further Consequences of the Rehabilitation Objective

21. The highly generalized concern of administrators about Inuit relying too much on government ‘handouts’ was felt by relocatees in various ways. The concern applied both to government support programs, such as family allowance and old age security, which were available to Canadians on a universal basis, and to relief, which was available only in case of hardship. Thus, the relocation scheme was aimed not only at changing expectations relief, but also at discouraging reliance on the universal programs. This would involve using administrative powers to restrict or withhold the actual benefit of their family universally available to Canadians. As a result, some of relocatees found that the benefit of their family allowance and old age security payments stopped after they left Inukjuak. The generalized concern about reliance on ‘handouts’ was also applied to all Inuit. Yet, not all Inuit, even in the Quebec part of the Arctic, were equally reliant on the combination of earned and unearned income. The relocatees were all not alike. Moreover, by 1953, conditions had improved considerably since the collapse of fur prices in 1949-50, and no able-bodied Inukjuak Inuit were receiving relief, outs’ and the understanding of local officials that this was ‘rehabilitation’ project served only to reinforce stereotypical attitudes that would adversely complicate relations between the relocatees and the local officials responsible for their well-being.

The Deputy Minister Approved Little More than a Concept

22. The government plan included no indication of representations or promises that were to be made to the Inuit. The plan, as approved by the Deputy Minister, was very general in its description of what was to be done and for that purpose. The detail would be worked out as the plan was implementing the decisions. The Deputy Minister approved little more than a concept.

The Promise to Return

23. The decision to extend a promise to return was made initially By Henry Larsen of the RCMP. It appears that the Department accepted this decision and, in fact, a departmental representative, Alex Stevenson, also extended a promise to return in his discussion with some Inukjuak Inuit. These promises were recorded in official memoranda and reports at the time. These documents are still in existence. No plan was developed by the Department to give effect to the promise, and the means to return were not made available to the Inuit. The content of the promise to return was never clearly defined, for example, whether it covered visits back and forth. If the promise was meant to apply only to the whole group, this was not conveyed to the Inuit.

No Special Instructions about Obtaining consent of Inuit

24. The RCMP detachment in northern Quebec and in Pond Inlet were responsible for recruiting Inuit for the relocation. The relocatees
were to be volunteers, but the department gave RCMP no special instruction about how to approach the Inuit or how to secure their consent, notwithstanding the well-known difficulty of obtaining genuine consent from Inuit. The RCMP member at Inukjuak responsible for carrying out these information understood that it was his responsibility to sell the Inuit on a project that was for their benefit, and that is what he did.

The Absence of Free and Informed Consent

25. It cannot be said that the Inukjuak Inuit gave free and informed consent to the relocation. The Inukjuak Inuit understood that they were going to a better place where there was an abundance of large land mammals, that they would be looked after, and that they would have the support of the Canadian government. Apart, in some cases, form an understanding that there would be dark period, the Inukjuak relocatees had no understanding of the disadvantages or risks of the project and did not believe that the relocation could change their lives fundamentally and adversely. Nor did they understand the rehabilitative character of the plan. What the Inukjuak Inuit were offered was less than what they had, in the sense that there would be less government income support available in the High Arctic and greater reliance on hunting. As a result, the relocatees, in addition to the many hardships suffered, experienced a sense of abandonment by the government and suffered considerable distress when their expectations of a significantly better life in the High Arctic were not met.

The Inukjuak Inuit Were Not Told of the Involvement of the Pond Inlet Inuit, and the Two Groups Did Not Get Along Well

26. The Inukjuak Inuit were not told that they would be joined by Pond Inlet Inuit. There are significant differences between the Inukjuak and Pond Inlet dialects, as well as differences in the two peoples’ way of living. The Inukjuak and Pond Inlet groups did not get along well in the new communities. The government’s desire was to have Pond Inlet Inuit involved in the relocation to help the Inukjuak Inuit adjust to High Arctic conditions. This idea failed, however, to take into account the disruptive effects of putting the different groups together in an isolated community.

Failure to Compensate Pond Inlet Inuit

27. The Pond Inlet Inuit found themselves providing a service to the government, giving guidance to the Inukjuak Inuit; they expected to be paid for this service but were not. The government failed to ensure that the conditions under which the Pond Inlet Inuit were participating were made clear to them. The government should accept responsibility for this misunderstanding.

The last-Minute Decision to Send Inukjuak Families to Resolute Bay

28. The original plan called for Inuit From Fort Chimo to go to Resolute Bay where they would find full-or part time employment. This aspect of the plan fell apart because the government never had any intention of providing housing for the Inuit at Resolute Bay, and the Fort Chimo Inuit were used to living in houses. The initial planning by the Department failed to accommodate the characteristics of the people. As a result, the employment aspect of the relocation to Resolute Bay was downplayed, ant it was decided that Inuit from Inukjuak would go to Resolute Bay instead to make their living by hunting and trapping.

Forced Separation of the Inukjuak Inuit

29. The Inukjuak Inuit understood that they would be going to the same place: they had not been told were going to Ellesmere Island. The Inukjuak Inuit would not learn that they were separated until they were already in the High Arctic, when they were separated and sent to different locations. This was painful and distressing for them and, in the circumstances, was clearly a forced separation.

Inadequate regard for the Needs of the Relocatees

30. The government proceeded with de termination to implement the plan once it had been set in motion, without regard to matters that should have been incorporated in the planning process. The relocatees would need caribou skins for bedding and clothing, which are vital for people living on the land. When the required skins were not available, the Department nevertheless proceed with the relocation, and the relocatees went north with 60 instead of 600 skins needed for clothing and bedding for the coming year. In addition, the relocatees arrived in the High Arctic without all the equipment they would need for life there.

The spread of Tuberculosis to Resolute Bay

31. The Inuit community at Resolute Bay became infected with tuberculosis which may have been carried from Inukjuak, resulting in additional hardship to the community as many members were transported south to hospital for extended periods.

The Eskimo Loan Fund was Used Improperly for Departmental Purposes

32. The trade store in the new communities were funded through the Eskimo Loan Fund. There is no evidence that the arrangements for the loan were discussed with the relocatees before departure. The signature of one of the Inuit as the borrower would be obtained by the police after relocatees arrived in the High Arctic. He loan arrangement lacked substance. The reality was that the Loan Fund was being used for departmental purposes, with an Inuk signing a loan agreement as a formality. The work of running the trade store was handled by the police. An Inuk signature on the loan agreement was a formality, not in the sense of being good legal form, but in the sense of something perfunctory and lacking in substance. In there circumstances, an Inuk’s signature on loan documents does not imply consent to the loan.

Isolation in the High Arctic

33. The environment in the new High Arctic communities was, in addition to the dark period, considerable different from Inukjuak. Climatic conditions and more severe, and varieties of game are significantly more limited. The move to the High Arctic thus involved significant changes for the Inukjuak relocatees. The Inukjuak Inuit also suffered isolation from home and the larger community at Inukjuak as a result of separation from immediate family, extended family, and friends who remained at Inukjuak. There was also isolation from those non-Inuit facilities that did exist in the new communities as a result of the separation of the Inuit settlement from non-Inuit facilities. Finally, isolation was created by the differences between the Inukjuak and Pond Inlet groups in very small communities consisting of only a few families.

The Hardship Adjusting to the New Land

34. The Inukjuak Inuit were placed in a situation where to survive they had to adapt to an area that was significantly different from the Inukjuak area in term of climate, terrain and hunting conditions. There were also significant differences in the type and variety of game and fish available: this meant that the Inukjuak relocatees had to adapt their hunting techniques to the new conditions, to learn where and when various types of game could be obtained most readily, and to adjust their equipment to the different terrain, particularly in the Grise Fiord area. Changes in diet were also required. At Grise Fiord, the Inukjuak Inuit would have to learn to obtain water from grounded icebergs. The Inukjuak Inuit were also used to burning wood, and although would could be found in the base dump in Resolute Bay, at Grise Fiord, seal oil lamps were the only means of cooking and provinding heat. The more severe weather and the periods of darkness made it more difficult to carry out daily tasks and required psychological adjustment. The Inukjuak Inuit found that adjustment difficult-and certainly much harder than they expected.

Risks to Inuit Health and Life in a Experimental Project and the Inadequacy of Mesures to Prevent Hardship

35. The relocation was an experiment to see whether the Inuit could adjust to lie in the High Arctic. There was real risk attached to the project if it turned out that the land could not support the Inuit or if the Inuit had severe difficulty learning how to exploit the resources of the new land. This risk would have become a reality at the Cape Herschel site if that aspects of the relocation had gone ahead. Game failed to materialize in the Cape Herschel area in the winter of 1953-54, and the land would not have been able to support the relocatees.

The supplies sent in for the trade stores at Resolute and Craig Harbour were not sufficient to support the people should they be unable to take sufficient game for food but were intended only to supplement what they could obtain from hunting. There is no evidence that the Department develop a sufficient to meet the communities’ food needs. The inherent riskiness of the project was not discussed with the Inuit. There were simply assured that there was abundant game in the High Arctic and that they would have a better life.

Some of the supplies intended for Resolute Bay did not arrive; eventually the missing supplies were flown in by the RCAF sometime after January 1954, more than five months after they should arrived. At both Craig Harbour/Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay, skins for clothing and bedding arrived late in the winter, in the early months of 1954. By contrast, if a Canadian government post had been established in the High Arctic and government personnel were missing essential items such as Arctic clothing and bedding, the government certainly would have arranging for these essential supplies to be sent immediately. The fact that the Department had arranged the relocation using the device of a loan limited the Department’s financial ability to respond to contingencies that developed in what was in substance a government-initiated relocation. The project was insufficiently funded, and as contingencies developed over years, as when supplies failed to arrive, cost considerations would outweigh considerations of Inuit welfare. Contingencies were absorbed in the form of increased hardship for the relocatees.

Inadequate Provisions for Necessary Boats

36. Large boats formed an important part life in Inukjuak ans were an important aspect of status in the community. These boats had been left behind in Inukjuak. The relocatees believed that there would be boats available for them in the new land. No arrangement had been made to provide the Inuit relocatees with boats.

Hardship and Suffering the Result of an Inherently Unsound Plan

37. The relocation was not a case of an appropriate plan running into difficulty because of failures in carrying in out. The plan was inherently unsound, and the means necessary to carry it out were equally unsound. The failures in execution served only to aggravate the hardship and suffering inherent in the plan from the outset.

Inadequate Supplies for the Trades Stores

38. The small trade store were chronically under stocked and, particularly at Grise Fiord, people suffered hardship year after year through the 1950s.

Difficulty in Finding Spouses

39. The small size of the communities made it difficult for young people to find spouses.

Restrictions on Movement

40. Grise Fiord lacked the employment opportunities of Resolute Bay, yet people were effectively prevent from moving from Grise Fiord to Resolute Bay to join relatives or to pursue other opportunities.

The failure to Honour the Promise to Return

41. The government fails to honour the promise to return, and the resulting hardship is not fully redressed by an offer to pay for a return many years after the return should have been provided. The lost years must be taking into account.

The Relocatees’ Experience were Predictable

42. The experiment of the relocatees were predictable result of a scheme that was inherently coercive in this objective and coercive in the means chosen to achieve that objective. The other failing in planning and implementation, as well as the failure to honour the promise to return, compounded the hardship suffered by the relocatees.